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Abstract
This two-part paper proposes a new collaborative approach to airframe maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO). A quantitative model
is introduced in Part I to represent the business relationships between original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and MRO enterprises.
In Part II, the presented model is used to assess potential financial benefits obtained by each of these stakeholders as a result of the
collaboration.
The quantitative model is built to capture the main dependencies between an independent MRO operating in South America and its
interactions with three major airframe OEMs. Interviews were conducted with MRO and OEM professionals to identify the most
impactful operational resources on MRO activities. Stakeholders with different characteristics in terms of production capacity, annual
revenue, fleet size, and age are considered in the numerical studies to quantify the viability of the proposed collaborative business model
in different scenarios.
The obtained results show that optimal investment levels must be determined for each stakeholder to ensure the viability of the proposed
collaborative business model, confirming the need for a quantitative method to aid service designers making decisions.
This collaborative model contributes to the relatively scarce literature on the topic and promotes effective and structured collaboration
between OEMs and MRO enterprises aiming at delivering higher added value to customers (operators).
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Introduction
In the companion of this paper (Part I), we introduced a quantitative model that represents the business relationships
between airframe original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and independent aviation maintenance, repair, and overhaul
(MRO) companies in order to assess the viability of a collaborative business approach to airframe service.
In the context of a growing MRO market driven by aircraft operators’ shift from in-house maintenance to outsourced
solutions (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013; Rosenberg, 2004), our quantitative model was built with the aim of
fostering collaborative and sustainable business approaches between manufacturers and service providers. This model is
intended to be a decision-making support tool that delivers additional value to aircraft operators. Vieira and Loures (2016)
observe a tendency within the MRO market of building up partnerships between stakeholders. The collaborative approach
proposed herein introduces the idea that OEMs and MRO enterprises should exchange product and in-service data,
http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/2159-6670.1182
and share operational resources in order to reduce their risk
of business failure, while delivering high-level services
to operators (Goncalves & Kokkolaras, 2017).
For example, OEMs could assume the responsibility of
providing special tools to partner MRO companies, ensuring
these resources would be readily available whenever req-
uired. Considering that OEMs have business relations with
several MRO firms around the globe (PIPAME, 2010), the
worldwide utilization level of those special tools would
certainly be much higher than if the MRO firm were to buy
them for its own usage, therefore justifying the investment
made by OEMs. In this case, OEMs could charge a symbolic
rental charge to MRO companies, or depending on the
agreement, the tool could be borrowed by MRO firms free
of charge. This may sound unacceptable for OEMs at a first
glance, but putting this rental cost in perspective against the
value generated to the customer and the benefits that OEMs
could receive from MRO firms in the form of something
like in-service data, then this cost may not turn out to be
significant. This assumption is confirmed by the results
presented in this paper, demonstrating that OEM invest-
ments have an insignificant negative impact on their gross
profit (GP) while having a significant positive impact on
MRO companies’ GP, as well as on operators’ savings. The
negative impact on OEMs’ GP is likely to be compensated
for by the positive financial results obtained from in-service
data collection and enhanced parts demand forecast.
It is valid to state, then, that the success of business rela-
tionships between these stakeholders is strongly dependent
on the design quality of these relations (Kurita, Uei, Kimita,
& Shimomura, 2012). Wallin (2013) noted that collabora-
tion across the supply chain is fundamental to the process
of creating more robust product–service business models.
In this ambit, a good design is one that considers the needs
and interests of all stakeholders. It is evident that current
manufacturers have been showing a unilateral design mind-
set, meaning that they only consider their own interests
when assessing the economic feasibility of service design.
They neglect observing the product–service system (PSS)
as a whole, including other stakeholders’ interests.
Within this context, this paper intends to demonstrate the
practical application and value of the quantitative model as
a design tool to support developing collaborative aviation
product–service business models. It constitutes a quantita-
tive means to assess the economic feasibility of relations
between MRO firms and airframe OEMs.
Configuration of Numerical Studies
The numerical studies aim to demonstrate that the
quantitative model presented in the companion (Part I) of
this paper can be used as a tool to aid OEMs and MRO
firms in building collaborative business strategies. With
such strategies, maintenance providers can benefit from
reduced expenditures in operational resources, operators
can profit from reduced maintenance turn-around times
(TATs), and manufacturers can benefit from in-service data
collection, which improves their product reliability (Canaday,
2016) and reduces inventory costs.
The proposed PSS business model is composed of three
main stakeholders: an MRO company, an OEM, and an
operator. In this section, ‘‘what if?’’ scenarios are created in
order to investigate how model outputs vary when the size
and operational capacity of the stakeholders change and
the monetary amounts invested by the OEM and the MRO
vary. Two distinct configurations are proposed and listed in
Table 1, which will be referred to as PSS1 and PSS2.
Additional parameter values have to be chosen in the
model. Real data from an independent MRO in South
America and its customers’ fleets have been used to select
the values of the first configuration. For the second config-
uration, parameter values were estimated by MRO experts.
They are grouped in five categories and are described in the






Estimated values were reviewed by six MRO and OEM
professionals:
1. Engineering/planning manager with 17 years of exp-
erience in MRO operations in Argentina and Brazil.
2. Quality and regulations manager with more than 30
years of experience in the international MRO sector,
as well as in a large airframe OEM in South America.
3. Maintenance manager with 18 years of experience in
airframe OEMs and MROs in North America and
South America.
4. MRO specialist with 16 years of experience from a
major European OEM located in Spain.
Table 1
Parameter values for two configurations PSS1 and PSS2.
Parameter Description PSS1 PSS2
GPOEM OEM’s annual gross profit $1B $1B
GPMRO MRO firm’s annual gross profit $3M $500M
NHCyear MRO firm’s capacity in numbers of heavy checks per year of a four-year-old B737NG 50 500
FHYperAC Aircraft average flight hours per year 3000 3000
OFS Operator’s fleet size 12 120
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5. CEO of an MRO in Brazil with more than 35 years of
experience in aviation.
6. Maintenance supervisor from Chile with more than
30 years of MRO experience
Model Parameters
Product Data Parameters
Product data such as component maintenance manuals
(CMM), service bulletins (SB), drawings, and diagrams,
etc., represent fundamental resources for the execution of
preventive and corrective maintenance. Any maintenance
task performed on an aircraft must comply with instructions
given in the technical publications of the manufacturer.
Lack of technical instructions during maintenance activities
leads to the interruption of the task. The first author’s years
of experience in the airframe maintenance industry suggest
that such cases of interruptions may occur often because the
required publications are not always available in a timely
fashion, obliging the MRO to start a last-minute procure-
ment process.
Values expressed in Table 2 are estimated by MRO
subject matter experts (SMEs); they take into account
historical data of cost and time to acquire the relevant
resources. Acquisition involves processes such as supplier
contact and request, purchasing, payment processing, and
import processing.
The values for the product data parameters do not
vary from configuration one to configuration two since
the times for resource acquisition are considered to be
a market average, and the required amount of investment
in subscriptions does not vary with the size of the
MRO firm.
In-Service Data Parameters
Maintenance intervals data are specified by manu-
facturers and published in a technical manual called
maintenance plan data, which is specific to aircraft type.
For example, the Boeing aircrafts B727-200 and B737-300
have different maintenance plans and thus distinct main-
tenance time intervals (McLoughlin, Doulatshahi, & Onorati,
2011). Other parameters, such as the average downtime
for a C-check (heavy check) and number of maintenance
reports generated per aircraft, depend not only on the type
in most cases, but also on the age of the aircraft considered.
The older the aircraft, the higher the likelihood of finding
discrepancies during inspections, thus the number of main-
tenance reports may be higher and the amount of downtime
may be longer. In this case, the values of in-service data
parameters do not vary from configuration one to config-
uration two since both configurations consider the same
type and age of aircraft. The type of aircraft and check
considered in this study are B737NG and C-check, respect-
ively. The average fleet age is considered to be four years
old (see Table 3 for in-service parameters).
Spare Parts Data Parameters
Spare parts are certainly one of the most critical
resources in the independent MRO business. Aircraft parts
are always quite expensive, so inventory cannot be kept at
high levels in a maintenance provider’s warehouse (Cohen
& Wille, 2006; SAS Institute, 2014). The solution is either
Table 2
Product data-related parameters.
Parameter Description PSS1 PSS2
LTidavg Average acquisition time of an installation drawing 3 days 3 days
LTfdavg Average acquisition time of a fabrication drawing 3 days 3 days
LTcmmavg Average acquisition time of a CMM 2 days 2 days
LTsbavg Average acquisition time of a SB 2 days 2 days
IRid Required annual investment in installation drawings in order to have zero gap $5,000 $5,000
IRfd Required annual investment in fabrication drawings in order to have zero gap $10,000 $10,000
IRcmm Required annual investment in CMMs in order to have zero gap $5,000 $5,000
IRsb Required annual investment in SBs in order to have zero gap $5,000 $5,000
Table 3
In-service data-related parameters.
Parameter Description Value Source
MMIavg/hc The considered average maintenance interval for a C-check. Depends on the type of aircraft. 6,000 FH Ali and McLoughlin (2012)
MDTavg/hc The market average aircraft downtime for a C-check of that specific aircraft model and age. 12d Estimate from MRO SMEs
MDThc The acceptable downtime for a C-check of that specific aircraft model and age as per
operator’s needs. There are some cases where a particular operator can accept a downtime
different from the market average.
15d Estimate from MRO SMEs
LDC The aircraft leasing cost per day, if applicable $20,000 Operator data
NRAC/year The estimated number of maintenance reports generated by one aircraft in a one-year time span
(model of aircraft and type of operation).
400 reports Estimate from MRO SMEs
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being able to make urgent purchases or utilizing a local
supplier.
Lack of parts leads to interruption of maintenance acti-
vities, which can often impact the aircraft TAT. Values
expressed in Table 4, like the values expressed in Table 2,
are estimated by SMEs from an MRO in South America
and take into account historical data of cost and time to
acquire those parts, which involves processes such as
procurement, purchasing, payment processing, and import
processing.
The following classification of spare parts is adapted
from the International Air Transport Association (IATA,
2015) where spare parts are originally classified as rotable,
repairable, and expendable, depending on criteria such as
scrap rate, cost, or life-cycle. In the scope of this research,
consumable is introduced, expendable is subdivided in two
types, and repairable is considered as being the same as
rotable.
The value of a TAT increase resulting from a missing
part is calculated as the difference between the acquisition
time of that unplanned resource (including procurement time,
import time, transportation, and utilization) and the time
originally planned for the rectification phase of the C-check
(see Figure 1 for the conceptual phases of a heavy check
considered in the context of this research).
The average acquisition time of the unplanned resources,
used to calculate the TAT increase, was estimated by the
parts procurement SME and confirmed by the purchasing
department’s historical data of the referred MRO (see
Table 6). That type of information (also called logistic lead
times) is recorded and stored in the material and resources
planning system of the company. The planned time of the
maintenance phases is estimated by the planning depart-
ment SME and is related to a C-check of a Boeing 737NG
aircraft.
Tooling Data Parameters
Similar to spare parts data parameters, values expressed
in Table 5 are estimated by SMEs from an MRO in
South America and take into account historical data of
cost and time to acquire these equipment and tools, which
involve processes such as procurement, purchasing, pay-
ment processing, and import processing.
The value of a TAT increase resulting from a missing
tool is calculated following the same rationale used for
spare parts. It is the difference between the time for acq-
uisition of that unplanned tool (including procurement
time, import time, transportation, and utilization) and the
time originally planned for the rectification phase of the
C-check.
Table 4
Spare parts data-related parameters.
Parameter Description PSS1 PSS2
IR The interest rate 5% 5%
TIcpavg The average TAT increase (days) due to lack of a consumable part 0 days 0 days
TIlepavg The average TAT increase (days) due to lack of a light expendable part 1 day 1 day
TIhepavg The average TAT increase (days) due to lack of a heavy expendable part 4 days 4 days
TIrotavg The average TAT increase (days) due to lack of a rotable part 1.5 days 1.5 days
IRcp The required investment in consumable parts in order to have zero gap $50,000 $500,000
IRlep The required investment in light expendable parts in order to have zero gap $100,000 $1000,000
IRhep The required investment in heavy expendable parts in order to have zero gap $3M $30M
IRrot The required investment in rotable parts in order to have zero gap $6M $60M
Figure 1. Impact on TAT due to lack of resources (Goncalves and Kokkolaras, 2017).
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The average acquisition time of the unplanned tool, used
to calculate the TAT increase, was estimated by the pro-
curement SMEs and also confirmed by the purchasing
department’s historical data of the referred MRO (see
Table 6). The planned time of the maintenance phases is
estimated by the planning department SME and is related to
a C-check of a Boeing 737NG aircraft.
Training Data Parameters
Physical resource availability, such as availability of
spare parts and tools, does not ensure good quality and
efficient maintenance services in MRO companies without
highly skilled personnel assigned to the related main-
tenance tasks (Dinero, 2005). The amount of training given
to the MRO’s maintenance personnel has a direct impact on
the company’s productivity and on TAT variations of the
maintenance services. In addition, certified maintenance
service providers must comply with international aviation
regulations by developing and executing their internal
training programs to ensure that technical personnel are
properly qualified to meet adequate standards. In this paper,
the amount of training given to maintenance technicians is
defined as a required resource.
The values of investment required in technical and
non-technical training (Table 7) are estimated by MRO
training SMEs (like training instructors) for configurations
one and two based on the company’s historical cost data
with training. The optimal TAT value is also estimated
by the company’s SMEs based on market practices and
is related to a C-check of a four-year-old Boeing B737NG
aircraft.
Numerical Results
Impact on Gross Profit
The first analysis assesses the impact on the OEM’s and
the MRO’s GP caused by different levels of investments
from each of them. In that sense, three investment scenarios
have been considered:




Parameter Description PSS1 PSS2
TINDIavg The average TAT increase (days) due to the lack of non-destructive inspection (NDI) equipment 1 day 1 day
TIhcavg The average TAT increase (days) due to the lack of a hydraulic cart 3.5 days 3.5 days
TIstavg The average TAT increase (days) due to the lack of special tools 1 day 1 day
TItsavg The average TAT increase (days) due to the lack of a test set 3.5 days 3.5 days
TIsjavg The average TAT increase (days) due to the lack of a special jig 2 days 2 days
IRNDI The required investment in NDI equipment in order to have zero gap $50,000 $500,000
IRhc The required investment in a hydraulic cart in order to have zero gap $250,000 $2,500,000
IRst The required investment in special tools in order to have zero gap $80,000 $800,000
IRts The required investment in test sets in order to have zero gap $250,000 $2,500,000
IRsj The required investment in special jigs in order to have zero gap $350,000 $3,500,000
Table 6
Spare parts and tools acquisition data and related TAT increase calculation.
Type of resource Acquisition time Phase 3 planned duration TAT increase
Tools and equipment
NDI equipment 5 days 4 days 1 days
Hydraulic cart 7.5 days 4 days 3.5 day
Special tools 5 days 4 days 1 days
Test sets 7.5 days 4 days 3.5 days
Special jigs 6 days 4 days 2 days
Spare parts
Consumable parts 2 days 4 days 0 days
Light expendable parts 5 days 4 days 1 day
Heavy expendable parts 8 days 4 days 4 days
Rotable parts 5.5 days 4 days 1.5 days
Table 7
Training data-related parameters.
Parameter Description PSS1 PSS2
IRtr Required annual investment in training in order to have zero gap $100,000 $1M
TATopt Optimum TAT (considering 100% resources available) 10 days 10 days
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2. The OEM makes 50% of the PSS-required invest-
ments and the MRO makes the other 50%.
3. The OEM makes 80% of the PSS-required invest-
ments and the MRO makes the remaining 20%.
In addition, the effect on total operator savings is also
quantified against the variation of the source of investment.
For each of the three scenarios, value ranges are defined
for the input variables of configuration one and configuration
two, as listed in Table 8.
The results obtained by exercising the quantitative
model presented in the companion (Part I) of this paper
are depicted in Figures 2–7.
Based on these results, we can draw the following
conclusions:
1. The first (100% investment from OEM) and third
(80% investment from OEM and 20% investment
from MRO firm) scenarios are the most attractive for
MRO companies. In the second scenario (50/50 invest-
ment), the MRO firm’s IGP is always 0% as the impact
on its GP is calculated as the difference between
investments made by the OEM and investments made
by the MRO.
2. Investments made by the OEM usually have an insig-
nificant negative impact on its GP, but a significant
positive impact on the MRO firm’s GP as well as
on operators’ savings. The negative impact on the
OEM’s GP can be compensated for by the financial
benefits of getting in-service data (enhancing parts
demand forecast). As an example, with an investment
of $6M for scenario 3 (80/20), the OEM’s impact
on GP is 0.07% against the MRO firm’s impact of
7% (100 times difference), while operators’ savings
are of the order of $200,000.
Table 8
Value range for investment input variables.
PSS1 PSS2
Min. investment Max. investment Min. investment Max. investment
Product data
Installation drawings $500 $5,000 $500 $5,000
Fabrication drawings $1,000 $10,000 $1,000 $10,000
CMM $500 $5,000 $500 $5,000
SB $500 $5,000 $500 $5,000
Spare parts
Consumables $5,000 $50,000 $50,000 $500,000
Light expendables $10,000 $100,000 $100,000 $1000,000
Heavy expendables $300,000 $3M $3,000,000 $30M
Rotables $600,000 $6M $6,000,000 $60M
Tooling
NDI $5,000 $50,000 $50,000 $500,000
Hydraulic cart $25,000 $250,000 $250,000 $2,500,000
Special tools $8,000 $80,000 $80,000 $800,000
Test sets $25,000 $250,000 $250,000 $2,500,000
Special jigs $35,000 $350,000 $350,000 $3,500,000
Training
Technical and non-technical $10,000 $100,000 $100,000 $1,000,000
Figure 2. PSS1 impact on GP versus total operator savings (100% investment from OEM).
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Figure 3. PSS1 impact on GP versus total operator savings (80% investment from OEM and 20% investment from MRO firm).
Figure 4. PSS1 impact on GP versus total operator savings (50% investment from OEM and 50% investment from MRO firm).
Figure 5. PSS2 impact on GP versus total operator savings (100% investment from OEM).
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3. Investments lower than $3M tend not to promote
savings for operators.
4. A small investment (0.09%) made by the OEM would
promote significant savings to both MRO and operators.
Financial Impact of Different Levels of Investment on
Operator Savings
This analysis consists of a simulation where all the required
resources are available except one. Thus, all investment vari-
ables are fixed to a 0% investment gap, except the one to be
tested. For the selected variable, five different values (ranging
from 20 to 100%) are assigned in order to verify how a
variation of the investment in the related resource will impact
operator’s savings with aircraft maintenance (TOpS).
Impact Caused by Lack of Investment on Product Data
Variations on related investments have no impact on
operators’ savings since the procurement and purchasing
time to acquire this sort of resource does not significantly
impact the TAT of the maintenance service.
Impact Caused by Lack of Investment on Spare Parts
Variations on operators’ related maintenance costs are
quantified for different levels of investments on spare parts.
The obtained results are depicted in Figures 8 and 9 for
PSS1 and PSS2, respectively. It should be noted that in
both PSS configurations, the investment gap on consum-
able parts causes no impact on operators’ savings as this
type of resource can be bought during the maintenance
service execution without increasing the TAT due to its
short logistics time. Conversely, heavy expendable parts
present the longest acquisition lead time; therefore, the
shortage of this type of resource causes a higher impact
on TOpS than any other spare parts variable. Comparing
results from PSS1 one PSS2, it can be observed that the
variables behave similarly; however, in configuration two,
TOpS does not decrease as abruptly as in configuration one.
Figure 6. PSS2 impact on GP versus total operator savings (80% investment from OEM and 20% investment from MRO firm).
Figure 7. PSS2 impact on GP versus total operator savings (50% investment from OEM and 50% investment from MRO firm).
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For instance, TOpS-Rotab decreases 23% in PSS1 when
varying the investment gap from 20 to 100%, but in PSS2
the T OpS- Rotab variation is only 13%. For T OpS-
Heavyexp that difference is even more evident: 70% in
configuration one against 39% in configuration two. These
results show that smaller operators are more sensitive to
resource availability variation than larger operators.
Impact Caused by Lack of Investment on Tooling
Tooling variables present behavior similar to that of
the spare parts variables. For both PSS configurations
(see Figures 10 and 11 for PSS1 and PSS2, respectively),
operators’ savings decrease with decreasing investments
in tooling resources. The lower the resource availability,
the higher the risk of TAT increase, representing losses to
operators. However, in configuration two, TOpS decreases
at a lower rate than it decreases in configuration one. For
instance, TOpS-Testsets decreases 60% in configuration
one when varying the investment gap from 20 to 100%,
but in configuration two, the T OpS-Testsets variation is
only 34%. These results reinforce the thesis that smaller
operators are more sensitive to resource availability varia-
tion than larger operators.
Impact Caused by Lack of Investment on Training
Lack of training negatively impacts productivity and
leads to TAT increase, resulting in a negative effect on
TOpS. However, if compared with other resources such as
test sets or heavy expendable parts, the impact of lack of
training on total operator savings is less significant.
According to Figure 12, variation from a 20 to 100% gap
in investments related to training will result in a $160,000
impact on T OpS for PSS1 and $1.5M impact for PSS2.
Impact Caused by Combined Effects
The previous numerical investigations demonstrate how
each investment variable impacts the total operators’ savings
individually. However, when the effect of low investments
on resources that are dependent on each other is combined,
the impact on operators’ savings may increase. For instance,
investment variables related to ‘‘installation drawings’’ and
‘‘light expendable parts’’ individually have no (or very low)
Figure 8. PSS1 total operator savings versus investment gap (spare parts).
Figure 9. PSS2 total operator savings versus investment gap (spare parts).
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impact on TOpS, but if combined, the impact on TOpS
becomes as high as the impact produced by heavy expend-
able parts shortage. This occurs due to the existing depend-
ency relation between these two resources; installation
drawings call up light expendable parts, so if an installation
drawing is not available during maintenance execution,
then the related task is interrupted while the drawing is
ordered and acquired. Eventually, as that drawing becomes
Figure 10. PSS1 total operator savings versus investment gap (tooling).
Figure 11. PSS2 total operator savings versus investment gap (tooling).
Figure 12. Total operator savings versus investment gap (training).
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ready for use, it is possible that a specific part called up on
it may not be available in the warehouse, requiring other
purchasing and logistics processes. Thus, the sum of the
acquisition lead times of the two resources will cause a
combined impact on maintenance service TAT. In the devel-
oped model, resources that present a dependency relation-
ship are installation drawings with light expendable parts,
fabrication drawings with heavy expendable parts, CMMs
with rotable parts, SBs with light expendable parts, and
NDI equipment with heavy expendable parts. Figure 13
depicts the impact of three different combinations on PSS1:
1) Installation drawings and light expendable parts.
2) NDI and heavy expendable parts.
3) Fabrication drawings and heavy expendable parts.
Individually, low investments on NDI do not produce
a significant impact on TOpS; however, the combination
of investment gaps on NDI and heavy expendable parts
does generate an impact on TOpS that is higher than the
one produced alone by short investments on test sets, for
instance. It is interesting to note that investment gaps above
80% in combined fabrication drawings and heavy expend-
able parts result in financial loss to operators.
Effect of Older Aircraft Fleets
The proposed quantitative model has also been tested
for two more configurations where the average B737NG
fleet age is considered to be 15 years old. The size of the
stakeholders in PSS configuration three is the same as it is
in PSS configuration two, and the size in PSS configuration
four is the same as PSS configuration one.
This numerical investigation aims at assessing whether
the proposed collaborative business model would still be
economically viable for older fleets where investments
in operational resources are higher, TATs are longer (see
Figure 14), and aircraft are expected to present not only a
higher rate of defects, but also more complex problems
during execution of heavy checks.
The same three investment scenarios are considered:
1) The OEM makes 100% of the PSS required investments.
2) The OEM makes 50% of the PSS required invest-
ments and the MRO firm invests the other 50%.
Similar to the younger aircraft case, the MRO firm’s
IGP is always 0% as the impact on its GP is calculated
as the difference between investments made by the
OEM and investments made by the MRO.
Figure 14. Planned TAT for older aircraft.
Figure 13. PSS1 total operator savings versus combined investment gaps.
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3) The OEM makes 80% of the PSS required invest-
ments and the MRO firm invests the remaining 20%.
However, the overall investments required for older
aircraft are assumed to be 50% higher than for the younger
airplanes. The obtained results are depicted in Figures 15–20.
Comparing results obtained for the older fleet (PSS3 and
PSS4) with the ones from PSS1 and PSS2, it seems that
older aircraft imply a higher risk to the manufacturer as
negative values of IGP can be observed (see Figures 15–20).
Figures 18 and 19, when compared respectively with
Figures 2 and 3, demonstrate that in configurations where
Figure 15. PSS3 impact on GP versus total operator savings (100% investment from OEM).
Figure 16. PSS3 impact on GP versus total operator savings (80% investment from OEM and 20% investment from MRO firm).
Figure 17. PSS3 impact on GP versus total operator savings (shared investments of 50% from OEM and 50% from MRO firm).
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MRO firms are smaller than OEMs (PSS1 and PSS4),
investments made by the OEM present low negative impact
on its GP, but a significant positive impact on the MRO
firm’s GP as well as on operators’ savings.
Discussion
Table 9 provides a summary to ease comparison between
the investigated configurations. Return on investment (ROI)
Figure 18. PSS4 impact on GP versus total operator savings (100% investment from OEM).
Figure 19. PSS4 impact on GP versus total operator savings (80% investment from OEM and 20% investment from MRO firm).
Figure 20. PSS4 impact on GP versus total operator savings (shared investments of 50% from OEM and 50% from MRO firm).
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for OEMs is calculated for each alternative to indicate
economic viability from the manufacturer’s perspective.
ROI is obtained for each scenario by calculating the ratio
between the OEM investment and the annual increase in
the OEM’s GP. Additionally, operator savings per aircraft
per year are reported so that gains to operators can be
compared regardless of their size.
In the PSS1 scenario where the OEM is responsible for
80% of all investments, a contribution made by the OEM
of $4.8M (or 0.48% of its GP) would generate an annual
positive financial return of 0.07% of its GP, thus paying its
investment back in about 6.5 years. Notwithstanding, what
appears to be a modest result to the OEM is revealed as a
significant positive impact of 7% on the MRO’s GP and
annual operator savings of $225k, which represents a very
positive impact on the maintenance budget of an operator
with a small fleet (twelve aircraft). Taking into considera-
tion a different investment scenario (OEM participating
with 50% of the total investments in PSS1), an investment
of $3M made by the OEM (and total PSS1 investment
of $6M) could be returned in a shorter period of time
(3.5 years) while promoting the same amount of savings
to the operator ($225k) and no significant impact on the
MRO’s GP. From the OEM’s standpoint, this investment
scenario is of higher interest than the one described first,
whereas both deliver similar levels of value to the operator.
Moreover, higher annual savings ($639k) could be pro-
moted for operators if an investment of $5.1M is made by
the OEM and the total PSS1 investment is $10.2M. It would
entail a less interesting financial return option to OEM
(payback in 7 years), but an almost three times better result
for the operator.
Regarding the results related to configuration PSS3,
in the scenario where 100% of investments are made by the
OEM, investments above $90M imply negative values of
IGPOEM to the OEM. Lower investment amounts produce
a positive impact on the OEM’s GP, but not necessarily
an adequate financial return. For instance, an investment of
$45M would produce a positive impact on the OEM’s GP
(0.27%) but a poor ROI (16 years).
All three investment scenarios related to PSS3 only
produce reasonable financial results to the OEM at lower
investment levels, such as in the 80/20 scenario, where an
investment of $12M would promote a ROI of 2.7 years.
Consequently, moderate value added is delivered to the
operator (only $8,000 of annual savings per aircraft).
Annual savings of $8,000 represent a moderate/weak result
to operators.
By comparing the stakeholder characteristics of the four
PSSs, it can be stated that PSS1 corresponds to PSS4 with
regards to their composition of stakeholders (large OEM,
small MRO, and small operator) and PSS2 corresponds to
Table 9
Summary of investigated configurations.






Operator savings Operator savings
per aircraft
PSS1
80% OEM, 20% MRO $4,800,000 0.07% 7.00% 6.5 $225,000 $18,750
50% OEM, 50% MRO $3,000,000 0.08% 0.00% 3.5 $225,000 $18,750
80% OEM, 20% MRO $2,400,000 0.09% 3.79% 2.7 2$85,000 2$7,083
100% OEM $6,100,000 0.07% 12.60% 8.7 $225,000 $18,750
50% OEM, 50% MRO $5,100,000 0.07% 0.00% 7 $639,000 $53,250
PSS2
80% OEM, 20% MRO $49,000,000 0.75% 0.43% 6.5 $6,000,000 $50,000
50% OEM, 50% MRO $30,000,000 0.86% 0.00% 3.5 $6,000,000 $50,000
50% OEM,50% MRO $15,000,000 0.95% 0.00% 1.6 $3,141,000 $26,175
80% OEM, 20% MRO $24,000,000 0.89% 0.22% 2.7 $3,100,000 $25,833
100% OEM $61,000,000 0.67% 0.73% 9.1 $6,000,000 $50,000
50% OEM, 50% MRO $51,000,000 0.73% 0.00% 7.0 $9,800,000 $81,667
PSS3
80% OEM, 20% MRO $72,000,000 0.11% 0.61% 65.5 $6,000,000 $50,000
80% OEM, 20% MRO $12,000,000 0.45% 0.10% 2.7 $970,000 $8,083
50% OEM, 50% MRO $45,000,000 0.27% 0.00% 16.7 $6,000,000 $50,000
80% OEM, 20% MRO $36,000,000 0.32% 0.30% 11.3 $3,000,000 $25,000
100% OEM $15,000,000 0.44% 0.17% 3.4 $970,000 $8,083
100% OEM $45,000,000 0.27% 0.50% 16.7 $3,000,000 $25,000
50% OEM, 50% MRO $7,500,000 0.48% 0.00% 1.6 $970,000 $8,083
50% OEM, 50% MRO $22,000,000 0.39% 0.00% 5.6 $3,000,000 $25,000
PSS4
80% OEM, 20% MRO $7,200,000 0.01% 10.40% 72.0 $216,000 $1,800
50% OEM, 50% MRO $750,000 0.05% 0.00% 1.6 2$315,000 2$2,625
80% OEM, 20% MRO $3,600,000 0.03% 5.21% 12.0 2$103,000 2$858
100% OEM $4,500,000 0.03% 8.69% 17.3 2$103,000 2$858
50% OEM, 50% MRO $6,000,000 0.02% 0.00% 35.3 $429,000 $3,575
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PSS3 (large OEM, large MRO, and large operator). A pair-
to-pair comparison reveals that aircraft age exerts criti-
cal influence in PSSs involving small MROs and small
operators. Results related to PSS4 demonstrate that alter-
natives of all investment scenarios are either economically
unfeasible to the OEM or decrease value to the operator.
Conversely, PSS1’s younger fleet promotes better financial
results to stakeholders as observed in its 50/50 investment
scenario, where a $3M OEM investment produces a ROI
of 3.5 years and annual savings to the operator of $18,750
per aircraft.
The aircraft age factor also poses challenges to the PSS2
and PSS3 configurations, but with lower intensity. When
comparing results related to these two PSSs, it can be con-
cluded that both configurations produce viable alternatives,
but PSS3 would deliver reduced added value to operators
compared to PSS2.
In addition, a comparison between PSS1 and PSS2 shows
that results vary linearly with the size of the stakeholders
(GP and aircraft number). Larger MROs present higher GP,
but require proportional investment amounts in operational
resources. In a PSS where the OEM is much larger than
the MRO, an irrelevant amount invested by the OEM may
represent the enabling factor for the MRO’s economic feas-
ibility. A fundamental observation when comparing both
PSS configurations is that a partnership between an OEM
and a large MRO would ask for a large investment that would
be concentrated in only one geographical region, while if
an OEM invests this same amount of financial resources
in several smaller MROs around the globe, a deeper level
of global in-service support capillarity could be reached,
promoting fleet coverage for a larger geographical area.
The assessment of impacts on total operator savings by
investment gaps with different combined variables shows
a possible case of an unfeasible PSS where the level of
investment for key resources is too low, implying negative
results to operators (combination three). In 2015, a real case
of an unbalanced and poorly designed PSS resulted in an
unsuccessful business. An airframe OEM in Brazil certified
two small MROs in the same region, but did so without
following a collaborative approach to facilitate their opera-
tion or taking into account the fact that the regional market
was not large enough to provide maintenance service for two
MROs. An unfeasible investment scenario for both MROs
resulted because expensive acquired operational resources
were underutilized, resulting in financial losses to those
companies and low service levels to operators.
In summary, the higher the total amount invested in the
PSS, the more added value is produced to operators. How-
ever, an adequate balance between the amounts invested by
OEMs and MROs must be assessed in terms of financial
return against the value delivered to the operator. There will
be cases where good profits can be achieved by OEMs and
MROs with moderate value provided to the operator and
other cases where the OEM and MRO may not obtain
significant financial results, but the PSS’s design could
promote high value added to the operator.
Therefore, the results presented in this section demon-
strate that designing business models for airframe main-
tenance services is a tricky activity. The success of a
business model between OEMs, MROs, and operators is
strongly dependent on the balance between the economic
and financial relations of these enterprises. A sustainable
PSS business model results from the adequate combination
of companies in terms of size and production capacity,
the age of the fleet, and the willingness and availability
to invest in the PSS. The numerical results presented in
Table 9 reveal that variations in these characteristics are
determinant for either the success or failure of the PSS,
leading to the conclusion that these business decisions must
be precise, with a very limited margin for mistakes. Two
other characteristics of companies within the aerospace and
aviation market reinforce the need for accurate business
decisions related to service design: (1) the wide majority of
these enterprises have been historically operating within
low economical margins and (2) decisions related to design
of service strategies are often not as quantitative as they
should be. Additionally, manufacturers often assess financial
viability of a strategy only under their perspective, not
taking into consideration the MRO’s specific needs. Comb-
ining these characteristics with the results presented in
Table 9, it can be concluded that there is a need for a more
systematic and quantitative means of supporting decision
makers in aerospace service design.
In such a context, this research presents a quantitative
tool to contribute to this critical decision-making process.
The tool represents an original solution to the aerospace
and aviation industries, aiding in the selection of effective
and sustainable PSS design alternatives.
Conclusion
This paper exercises the model presented in its companion
(Part I) to investigate numerically the impact of different
scenarios of aviation MRO firms and airframe OEM collab-
oration based on the exchange of value-adding resources.
In the proposed collaborative business strategy, OEMs
must support MRO firms by increasing the availability
of critical resources to the maintenance providers, such as
parts, tools, equipment, product data, and training.
A practical example of that type of support could be a
local or regional OEM-owned warehouse being strategi-
cally located close to an MRO firm, or even inside their
facilities, in order to ensure that operator demand is met in
a timely fashion. Access to technical training and product
data can also be facilitated in many forms by OEMs to
MRO firms as an operational means of the proposed
collaborative business model.
Certainly, investments to be made by the OEM may
seem to create a negative impact on its financial results.
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Notwithstanding, the obtained results demonstrate that,
in certain investment scenarios, this impact can be com-
pensated by potential benefits to OEMs, such as access to
in-service data or enhanced parts demand forecast.
Main business relationships between MRO firms, OEMs,
and operators are captured and applied as an innovative
tool that fosters a collaborative mindset to support the
decision-making process.
Limitations and Future Work
It is important to highlight some limitations related to the
presented model, such as that it only allows an analysis of
business models that involve only one type of aircraft and
heavy check at the time. Future studies are encouraged to
enhance this quantitative model so as to support multiple
types of aircrafts and heavy checks. Despite that limitation,
the current model can be applied to cases where the OEM
has multiple investments in MROs globally, as well as to
cases where the MRO receives multiple investments from
different OEMs. Each combination of OEM and MRO would
be treated as a specific PSS configuration with a particular
set of parameters that could be assessed individually.
Additional effort is also recommended to evolve this
quantitative collaboration method to an optimization
model. This would enable both an assessment of more
complex investment scenarios with an increased number
of resources, and the identification of partnerships that
maximize the GP of OEMs and MROs, as well as savings
to operators.
The collaborative approach proposed herein between
airframe OEMs and MRO enterprises could be extended to
manufacturers of aerospace components (engines, landing
gears, auxiliary power units, electronic modules, etc.) and
their respective independent service network.
Further studies could also be developed using datasets
collected over a period of time for various MROs and
OEMs in other jurisdictions to validate how acquisition
of in-service data can reduce maintenance intervals due to
increased product reliability.
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